Book II, Chapter 1-2

Two senses of actuality:

Analogies:

1. Axe
   1. Second act (defining activity): to cut
   2. First act, which is the potency for the second act: the form or essence of an axe
      • The form which makes it possible for an axe to cut is the sharpness of its blade.
      • Sharpness, must be realized, instantiated in matter of a certain type, i.e. with a certain hardness - e.g. steel.
      • In order to be an axe, a thing has to have a hard, sharp blade, so that it perform the defining activity of an axe. The form of axe (first act) cannot exist unless it is in matter, and matter of a certain type (hard sharp steel). If something merely looks like an axe (if it is made out of wax) but it does not have a hard, sharp blade, it will be an axe in name only.
      • The form of axe has an essential and necessary relationship to the matter in which it is realized.
2. Eye
   1. Second act: to see = to be aware of color and light by being affected by objects
   2. First act: ability to see, i.e. the power of sight
      • the form which makes it possible for an eye to see is the power of sight.
      • the power of sight must be realized in an organ made of certain kind of matter, i.e. transparent liquid (water) in order that it be receptive of color and light (since this receptivity is what defines the power).
      • In order to be an eye, a thing has to contain water, so that it can perform the defining activity of an eye. The form of eye (first act) cannot exist unless it is in matter, and matter of a certain type (water in an organ that is alive). If something merely looks like an eye (if it is made out of wax) but it is not an organ containing water with the power of sight, it will be an eye in name only.
      • The form of eye has an essential and necessary relationship to the matter in which it is realized.
3. Living body
   1. Second act: to live = to feed and grow, sense and move, think
   2. First act: ability to engage in these vital activities
      • the form which makes it possible for a living body to be alive.
      • the soul must be realized in a body of a given type, i.e. a body with organs capable of (having the potency to) engaging in the vital activities which is characteristic of the kind of living thing of which the soul is the first act.
      • In order to be a dog, for instance, a thing has to have a body capable of barking, so that it can perform the defining activity of a dog. The form of a dog, i.e. the dog’s soul (first act), cannot exist unless it is in matter, and matter of a certain type (a living body capable of barkiing). If something merely looks like an dog (if it is made out of wax) but it is not a living body capable of barking, it will be an dog in name only.
      • The soul of a living thing has an essential and necessary relationship to the body which it makes to be alive.

Body and soul are one as the wax and its impression are one.

Soul, and parts of the soul, are actualities of the body, and so cannot exist apart from the body, unless there is an activity of soul which is not the activity of an body, or any organ.

However, if there is an activity of soul apart from the body, that part (at least) may be separate. (This is the theoretical basis for arguing that the mind is separate because its activity is not (and could not be) the activity of the body.)

Book II, Chapters 5 & 12

Sensation seems to be a kind of alteration:

• a perceiver is affected by an object outside of itself
• perception is the process of coming to be like the thing perceived - the visual field becomes red when looking at a red object.

Two kinds of alterations:

1. Normal - material (alteration - aliosis, becoming other)
   • come to have a new quality-receive form
   • replacement of one quality by its contrary
   • potency to undergo the change is completely exhausted by the change
2. Special - immaterial (actualization - becoming perfected or complete)
   • Come to have a new quality
   • quality received is the completion, perfection of the patient.
   • potency to undergo the change is not exhausted once the change has occurred.

Second kind of alteration is the reception of form without matter (even though it occurs in a material thing, i.e. the sense organ, e.g. the eye).

Form received is not merely like object, but the same as the object: the form of the object is in the perceiver in an immaterial way.

Book III, Chapters 4 & 5

Intellect is like sense:

is affected - actualization
receives the form of its object - immaterial reception
becomes one with its object

I. Argument from the universal range of thinking (receptivity)

The co-presence (material nature) of a cognitive power hinders reception.
Mind knows all - mind is not hindered at all.
Therefore, mind is not mixed, not blended.

Mind has no physical quality (it is neither hot nor cold), and there is no organ for thinking.

II. Argument from the impassibiliity of thinking (affectation)

Organ of sense allows sense to be over-powered.
Mind is never over-powered.
Therefore, mind has no organ.

III. Argument from the universality of its objects.

The object of the mind is the universal.
Every material thing is particular, and is object of sense.
Therefore, mind is not material.

Mind has no content until it thinks; it's thoughts are in it like writing is on a tablet on which nothing is written.  (The mind is a blank slate (tabula rasa); there is no innate knowledge (contra Plato).) It abstracts forms from matter.

Possible/Active intellect (potential - sense images about which we think).

Active mind (alone) is immortal and eternal.