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Having just argued that angels are pure forms,
and have no matter whatsoever (not even "spiritual matter" which
Franciscan theologians, like St. Bonaventure, posited), Aquinas goes on
to explain that angels nevertheless have some composition. Thus, they
are not altogether simple beings. This is important for him to explain
because traditionally only God is completely simple, i.e. the Being
without any composition at all. For the Christian theologians of the
Middle Ages, God is properly understood to be simple and the only simple
being, because everything that is composite depends on what it is
composed of. God does not depend on anything, but everything other than
Him depends on Him.
This is true, unless, perhaps, there is something whose quiddity is
its very act of existing. This thing would have to be unique and
primary, since it would be impossible for anything to be multiplied
except by the addition of some difference, as the nature genus
is multiplied into species; or by a form being received in diverse
matters, as the nature species is multiplied in dfferent
individuals; or by one being absolute, and the other being received
in something. For example, if there were a certain "separated" heat
it would be distinct, in virtue of its very separation, from the heat
which is not separated.
If, however, something is posited which is simply its own act of
existing, such that it would be subsistent existence itself, this
existence cannot recieve the addition of a difference, because then
it would not be simply an act of existing, but an act of existing
plus this certain form. Even less would it receive the addition of
matter, because then it would not be subsistent existence but material
existence. Hence, there remains only one such thing that is its own
act of existing. Accordingly, in anything other than it, the act of
existing must necessarily be other than its quiddity or nature or form.
Hence among the intelligences (angels), their acts of existing must be
other that their forms. Therefore, it is said that intelligences are
(composed as) forms and acts of existing.
Whatever belongs to something is either caused by the principles of
its nature, like risibility in man, or accrues to it from some extrinsic
principle, like the light in the air which is caused by the sun. It is
impossible that the act of existing itself be caused by the form or
quiddity -- and by "caused" I mean as by an efficient cause -- for
then something would be the cause of itself and produce itself in
existence which is impossible. It is therefore necessary that
everything whose act of existing is other than its nature have its act
of existing from another. And because everything which exists through
another is reduced to that which exists through itself, as to a first
cause, there must be something which causes all things to exist, inasmuch
as it is subsistent existence alone. Otherwise we would proceed to
infinity in causes, since everything which is not a subsistent act of
existing has a cause for its act of existing, as we have just said.
It is evident, therefore, that an intelligence is form and an act of
existing, and that it has its act of existing from the First Being
which is (simply) existence only; and this it the First Cause, God.
Adapted from Selected Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas,
Robert P. Goodwin, trans., (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965).
View the complete text of On Being and Essence
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[ Topics | Questions | Bibliography | Links | Bookstore ] On Being and Essence, Ch. 4 (excerpt)
Although substances of this kind (separate intelligences
or angels) are simple forms without matter, nonetheless they are not in
every way simple as pure acts are. They do have an admixture of potency,
which is evident in the following way. Whatever is extraneous to the
concept of an essence or quiddity comes to it from beyond itself, and
forms a compsition with the essence since no essence can be understood
without those things which are its parts. On the other hand, every
essence or quiddity can be understood without its act of existing
being undersood. I can understand what a man or phoenix is, and yet
not know whether or not it exists in reality. Therefore, it is evident
that the act of existing is other than essence or quiddity.
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Joseph M. Magee, Ph.D. - Last Updated 11/3/99